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Theorizing Human Resource Management and the Firm’s Demand for HRM Practices 
 
 
Abstract. Drawing on the economics and industrial relations literatures, this paper argues 
that the conventional conceptualization and theorization of human resource management, 
and the attendant empirical literature on the HRM-firm performance relationship, are 
likely to suffer from significant problems of mis-specification and limited domain. A new 
theoretical framework is advanced that generalizes the HRM concept, models the linkage 
between HRM practices and firm performance (the “black box”), generates an HRM 
input demand function and demand curve, and demonstrates how these analytic tools can 
explain major features of the distribution of HRM practices among firms and over time.  
 
In this paper I present a new approach to theorizing human resource management (HRM). 
The theory is economics-based, but with significant roots in early industrial relations. 
This theory makes two important contributions. The first is to demonstrate that the 
current mode of theorizing HRM is subject to potentially significant problems of limited 
domain and mis-specification. The second contribution is to provide a new conceptual 
framework for analyzing and understanding firms’ choices of human resource 
management practices. The chief theoretical innovations are twofold. First, I use 
transaction cost theory to analyze whether a firm coordinates HRM through supply and 
demand in the external labor market or management command and administration in the 
internal labor market. Among other insights, I demonstrate that a large number of 
alternative HRM systems, including one with no HR department or formal HRM 
practices, are equally “best practice” and “high performance.” Given that firms can 
maximize performance with many different employment systems, I next model the 
determinants of this choice. To do so, I use the microeconomic theory of factor input 
demand, treat HRM practices as an input into production, and derive an HRM demand 
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curve and HRM demand function. These tools yield numerous implications and 
hypotheses, some of which contradict conventional propositions in the HRM field.  
 
Defining and Conceptualizing HRM 
Fruitful theorizing of HRM can only proceed with a clear, consistent and robust 
definition and conceptualization of what HRM is and does. In the words of David Guest 
(1997: 264), in both theoretical and empirical work “we need to have a clear view of our 
independent variable.”  
Does such exist? Guest concluded not, arguing “we seem to have only confusion.” 
Paauwe and Boselie (2005: 69) in a more recent review of the literature agree, concluding 
“There appears to be no consensus on the nature of HRM.” Part of the reason is that 
HRM is used with at least five distinct meanings (listed from broadest to narrowest):  
• the science and practice that deals with the nature of employment 
relationships (Dulebohn, Ferris and Stodd, 1995) 
• the management of people in organizations (Boxall and Purcell, 2003)  
• a unitarist, human capital approach to people management (Storey, 2001) 
• a strategic, high performance/high involvement approach (Delery, 1998)  
• the policies, programs and activities associated with a human resource 
department (Ulrich, 1998).  
If one is going to theorize HRM, the relevant question is: which one of these five 
concepts is the object of theorizing? The problem for theorizing is more difficult yet, for 
one also has to distinguish HRM from strategic human resource management (SHRM). 
The difference in titles presumably signals the key difference – SHRM is strategic and 
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HRM is not, suggesting that the fourth definition above (or some variant) is actually 
SHRM and one of the other four applies to HRM. But many authors maintain that a key 
feature of HRM is precisely that it is a strategic approach to people management (in 
contradistinction, say, to personnel management), so considerable blurriness remains. To 
better separate the two, some writers (e.g., Becker and Huselid, 2006) argue that SHRM 
deals with organizational performance and systems of practices and HRM deals with a 
individual employee performance and individual HRM practices. While certainly a 
plausible distinction, it also seem to imply that the field will have two different (but 
perhaps overlapping) theories – one for HRM (micro) and another for SHRM (macro).  
Viewed from another perspective, the conceptualization of HRM does seem to 
enjoy a high degree of consensus. Regardless of other differences in the definition of 
HRM, most academic writers agree that a common feature of the HRM “independent 
variable” is that it is synonymous with the concept of practices. Wright, Dunford and 
Snell (2001: 703) define “practices” as “those HR tools used to manage the human capital 
pool.” Exactly what qualifies as an HR tool is not well specified in the literature, but most 
often writers define HRM practice as some type of formal/tangible HR method, 
technique, activity, program, or structure that management creates and administers to 
manage the workforce. Examples include a formal human resource (HR) department, 
employee selection tests, job analysis, training programs, pay-for-performance 
compensation methods, and promotion by seniority. Evidence in support of the “practice” 
conception of HRM is widespread. Wright and McMahan (1992: 297) state in their 
influential article, for example, that HRM “consists of the various practices used to 
manage people in organizations, and these practices have commonly been grouped into 
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subdisciplines of selection, training, appraisal, and rewards…,” while Paauwe and 
Boselie (quoted above, p. 69) observe, “the majority of studies define HRM in terms of 
HR practices or systems/bundles of practices.” Lepak and Snell (1999) define alternative 
systems of practices as “HRM architectures.”  
If human resource practices are taken as the sine qua non of HRM, then it would 
seem that the job of an HRM theory is to explain and predict the organization’s choice of 
these HRM practices and associated bundles. This matter is complex and challenging, 
since many dozens of different HRM practices exist and firms can mix and match them in 
a practically infinite number of permutations.  
It turns out, however, that the dominant method of conceptualizing HRM/SHRM, 
reflecting in part its reliance on the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm for a 
theoretical foundation, predisposes the answer toward one particular architecture, and 
variants thereof. The presumption of HRM/SHRM is that firms choose (or should 
choose) HRM practices in order to achieve maximum firm performance. Of the many 
performance measures utilized in the literature (turnover, productivity, etc.), profitability 
is generally recognized as the most fundamental and important since in a market 
economy survival and growth rest upon it (Boxall and Purcell, 2003: 7-8). Profits, we 
know, are the difference between revenue and cost. One way to boost firm performance, 
therefore, is to lower cost, the other is to increase revenue (or “value”).  
At this point enters the distinction between personnel management (PM) and 
human resource management. The conventional portrayal is that personnel management 
(and the closely associated field of industrial relations (IR)) take a pluralistic approach to 
the employment relationship, look at employees as an expense, and are practiced with a 
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reactive/transactional focus on operational efficiency and cost minimization, while 
human resource management takes a unitarist approach to the employment relationship, 
looks at employees as an organizational asset (human capital), and are practiced with a 
strategic (proactive) focus that seeks to develop, incent and deploy a firm’s human capital 
so as to maximize long-term profits (Beer and Spector, 1984; Dulebohn, Ferris, and 
Stodd, 1995).  
Given this conceptualization of HRM/SHRM, the question then becomes: what 
bundle of people management practices does the best in fostering a unitarist/human 
capital/high performing employment system?, and the most common answer given is 
some variant of what has become known as a high performance work system (HPWS). 
The linchpin of an HPWS is commonly thought to be some form of employee 
involvement (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001), which led McMahan, Bell and Virick (1998: 
197) to state “what we call strategic human resource management may well be ‘second 
generation’ employee involvement with a relationship to firm strategy and performance.” 
Also core features of an HPWS are practices such as mutual-gain systems of 
compensation, self-managed teams, careful employee selection, job security policies, 
formal methods of dispute resolution, and reduction in status differentials.  
Of course, the question remains how these HRM practices (allegedly) generate 
high firm performance. This link is frequently referred to as the “black box” since it has 
tended to remain opaque and under-theorized (Boxall and Purcell, 2003). Increasingly, 
however, this missing link is answered with what is sometimes called “AMO theory” 
(Appelbaum, Berg, Bailey and Kallenberg, 2000; also see MacDuffie, 1995). This theory 
argues that best practice HRM leads to higher firm performance because it augments and 
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enables the abilities, motivation, and opportunities of the firm’s human capital, which 
translates into higher productivity, product quality, customer service, etc.  
In empirical studies of the HRM-firm performance relationship, the dependent 
variable is therefore some measure of organizational performance and the independent 
variables are a set of advanced/formalized HRM practices typically associated with an 
HPWS. On this matter, Purcell and Kinnie (2007: 538) observe, “The lists [of 
independent variables] appear to emerge from sets of practices normally associated with 
activities undertaken by well-staffed, sophisticated HR departments in large firms often 
linked to so-called ‘transformational’ approaches to the management of labor.”  
The most important theoretical rationale for this specification of HRM comes 
from the resource based view of the firm. Allen and Wright (2007: 90) state, for example, 
“the resource-based view has become the guiding paradigm on which virtually all 
strategic HRM research is based.” In the 1980s, the dominant approach to strategy came 
from industrial organizational economics, particularly the work of Michael Porter, and 
sought to theorize how firms could position themselves for competitive advantage vis a 
vis their opportunities and threats in the external environment. The RBV, most 
influentially articulated by Barney (1991), shifted the focus and sought to theorize how 
firms can capture competitive advantage by developing and exploiting valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources within the organization. The common theme 
in the HRM/SHRM literature is that traditional sources of competitive advantage, such as 
economies of scale, new technology and differentiated products, are eroding due to 
shorter product life cycles, greater competition in product markets, and more mobile 
capital and technology, leaving firms’ human capital as one the last and best sources of 
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sustained competitive advantage. The role of HRM/SHRM, therefore, is to establish a 
system of HRM practices that transforms a firm’s employees from commodities and 
“hired hands” that provide negligible competitive advantage and middling work 
performance to human assets that provide sustained competitive advantage and 
considerable value-added through heightened work motivation, expanded job 
opportunities, and unique and hard-to-imitate skills, knowledge and abilities. Thus, in the 
words of Allen and Wright (pp. 91-2), “the RBV provided a legitimate foundation upon 
which HRM researchers could argue that people and the human resources of a firm could 
in fact contribute to firm-level performance and influence strategy formulation.”  
 Although the RBV provides the central pillar of theory for the conventional 
conceptualization, other strands of theory also play a role. Schuler and Jackson (2001), 
for example, list thirteen different theoretical perspectives that inform HRM research. 
Among these, a frequently cited contribution is by Delery and Doty (1996).  
They distinguish three different theoretical perspectives on HRM: universalistic, 
contingency, and configurational. The universalistic perspective argues that there is a set 
of HRM practices that are always and everywhere “best practice” in the sense they 
promote superior firm performance in all situations. Pfeffer (1998: 64-65), for example, 
lists seven such HRM practices – employment security, selective hiring of new personnel, 
self-managed teams/decentralized decision-making, pay-for-performance, extensive 
training, reduced status differentials and extensive information sharing, and argues that 
together they can lead to increased profitability of 40 percent or more (p. 32). These 
seven practices are among the core people practices identified with an HPWS and, 
consequently, “best practice” HRM and HPWS have become closely associated.  
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The contingent approach suggests there is no universal “one best way” to do 
HRM; rather, the best performing set of HRM practices are contingent on the firm’s 
particular business strategy and other external and internal contextual variables (e.g., 
industry, technology of production, economic environment, workforce characteristics, 
legal and union influences). Rather than “best practice” this approach to HRM is called 
“best fit.” Of the various contingent variables, HRM theorists have focused most heavily 
on the firm’s choice of business strategy. Different typologies of business strategies have 
been developed, such as “prospector vs. defender” and “cost minimization vs. product 
differentiation,” and theorists have then sought to identify the HRM practices that most 
closely align with and support these alternative strategies (e.g., Arthur, 1994). A central 
idea generated from this line of research is the notion of “vertical fit” – that is, the firm’s 
HRM practices should maximally support achievement of the firm’s business strategy.  
The configurational approach argues that HRM practices should not be looked at 
individually but as a system. The key idea is that there exist complementarities among 
HRM practices and thus firms need to mix and match HRM practices so they not only 
maximally support the overall business strategy but also so they maximally support each 
other and generate the most synergy. In effect, HRM practices are not additive but 
interactive. The central idea derived from the configurational model is “horizontal fit” – 
that is, the firm must look at HRM practices as a system and choose the individual 
components so they are create the most synergistic system possible.  
The configurational approach is complementary to either the universal or 
contingent approach; the latter two, however, potentially conflict in their theoretical 
implications for HRM. As some authors have noted, for example, a contingent-based 
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theory can lead to the conclusion that high performance is generated by a “low road” 
HRM system or one that is highly externalized and makes use of few HRM practices 
(Legge, 2005; Lepak and Snell, 2007).   
In practice, the main current of HRM theorizing has sought to integrate these 
three perspectives into a holistic model that retains universalistic best practice HRM at 
the core (based on RBV/AMO theory) but with the recognition that the precise choice of 
HRM practices will vary from firm-to- to firm, and among employee groups within firms, 
with differences in business strategies and other contextual factors. The net result is that 
the main body of HRM theory points to an HPWS-type employment system as the best 
candidate for high performance, but with recognition that this relationship is moderated 
by strategic and contextual factors and does not uniformly apply to all firms and work 
groups (Becker and Huselid, 2006; Datta, Guthrie, and Wright, 2005; ). This presumption 
is reflected in HRM-firm performance empirical studies where the predicted “main” 
effect is a positive relationship between HRM and firm performance, moderated by the 
indirect effect of the firm’s strategy and other such variables (Martín-Alcázar, Romero, 
and Sánchez-Gardey, 2005). Although the findings of empirical studies are diverse and 
not entirely consistent, the median conclusion is that some core group of advanced 
HPWS-type HRM practices are indeed associated on average with higher firm 
performance, while the role of business strategy and other contextual factors is more 
uncertain and difficult to isolate (Combs, et. al., 2006; Becker and Huselid, 2006).  
All things considered, then, what is the answer in the literature to the question: 
what is HRM? The review just provided suggests, on one hand, that HRM has multiple 
but partially overlapping conceptions and no single definition can be given that covers all 
 10
writers and studies. This review also suggests, on the other hand, that both in theory and 
empirical work one conception of HRM dominates the others. While lip service is given 
to the idea that HRM is the generic practice of people management, most (but not all) 
writers rather quickly proceed to telescope the concept into a particular philosophy and 
approach to people management built on an integrated system of advanced practices that 
attains maximum organizational performance through a mix of strategic, unitarist, human 
capital, and high involvement methods (Guest, 1997). That is, positively and/or 
prescriptively the dominant conception is: HRM ≈ HPWS. Marchington and Zageleyer 
(2005: 4) attest to this fact when they observe, “”While it is rare to state this explicitly, 
most studies looking at the HRM-performance linkage use some variant of the high 
performance model.” Further, this model of HRM is frequently implicitly or explicitly 
equated with the strategic role, functions and activities of an HR department (Ulrich, 
1998; also noted by Becker and Huselid, 2006: 922).  
 
Problems of Mis-Specification and Restricted Domain  
Is the unitarist/HPWS version of human resource management fruitful for theorizing? I 
argue it has serious limitations. In particular, it suffers from significant restricted domain 
and leads to mis-specification of both theoretical and empirical models. These problems 
have been recognized in the literature (e.g., Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Wright, Snell and 
Dyer, 2005), but have not been fully appreciated or dealt with.  
Problems of restricted domain and mis-specification in HRM theorizing are made 
clear with the help of Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 shows a frequency distribution of HRM 
practices for a large sample of American companies. The data come from a 1994 
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nationally representative survey of over two thousand workers conducted by Freeman 
and Rogers (1999). The respondents were asked whether their organization currently used 
each of ten different HRM practices, including several items usually considered “best 
Figure 1. Distribution of Firms by Advanced HRM Practices 
 
practice” (e.g., an employee involvement program, a formal dispute resolution system). 
Freeman and Rogers combined the ten items into a composite index number and called it 
a measure of “advanced human-resource practices.” Graphing the data yields the 
distribution shown in Figure 1.  
 This HRM frequency distribution resembles a bell-shaped curve but with 
considerable skewness in the right-hand tail. A significant minority of firms, located in 
the left-hand tail, used very few or even none of these ten formal HRM practices (e.g., 
nearly one-third of workers said their firm had no personnel/HR department); the 
majority used an intermediate number, while a relatively small proportion of firms 
scattered over the right-hand tail used many of the ten HRM practices, including most or 
all of the “advanced” practices (e.g., employee involvement). Interestingly, plotting data 
on “HRM expenditure per employee,” collected by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA, 
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2006) for a large sample of firms, exhibits much the same distribution, suggesting the 
Freeman & Rogers data is roughly representative. 
 Figure 1 poses two serious challenges for the dominant conceptualization of 
HRM/SHRM. First, if HRM is defined and conceptualized as some variant of an HPWS, 
then a theory of HRM (so defined) must of necessity suffer from a highly restricted 
domain of relevance. Freeman and Rogers do not report the percent of firms at each point 
in the distribution, nor do they suggest a dividing line to separate non-HRM/HPWS firms 
from those using HRM/HPWS. Nonetheless, inspection of Figure 1 suggests that HPWS-
type firms are surely a modest-sized minority of the total, for they reside in the skewed 
right-hand tail that has relatively few observations. Other survey evidence for the UK and 
USA confirms this conclusion (e.g., Legge, 2005; Marchington and Zagelemyer, 2005). 
In effect, then, HRM/SHRM becomes a theory of the right-hand tail of the distribution 
which, quantitatively speaking, makes HRM the theory and study of a special case. This 
is acknowledged by Becker and Huselid (2006: 904) who say, “This current approach to 
theorizing… implies very little variation or differentiation of the HR architecture,” and is 
implied by Marlow (2006) when she chose to title her article: “Human Resource 
Management in Smaller Firms: A Contradiction in Terms?” This restricted domain 
problem is actually worse that Figure 1 suggests, for the right-hand tail diminishes to 
near-zero in earlier historical periods (e.g., pre-World War I America) and for many other 
countries today with different cultural, economic and legal environments. This 
conceptualization, therefore, makes HRM a phenomenon limited largely to the post-1970 
period, in larger-sized firms with a formal HR function, and in North America and to a 
lesser degree other advanced countries (Brewster, 2004).  
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 Alternatively, one could define HRM generically to include all people 
management practices, which then makes HRM coterminous with the entire distribution. 
The problem here is that most forms of HRM/SHRM theory, being based on RBV 
principles, predict that most/all firms will maximize performance by adopting a package 
of “advanced” HRM practices along HPWS lines. Since only a minority of firms in 
Figure 1 actually adopted such an HRM package, a huge and troubling gap exists 
between what HRM theory predicts and what the firms actually do.  
One possibility is that the theory’s prediction is wrong; perhaps, for example, a 
“low road” or “control” HRM system actually is superior in some/many situations for 
firm profitability.  
Another possibility is that the theory is correct but surveys and empirical studies 
mis-measure the HRM practice variable, leading to a false inference (Wall and Wood, 
2005). For example, some HPWS practices are general management policies or 
approaches, such as job security, careful selection and a positive employee relations 
climate, which may not be captured by any formal, specific HR functional “tool” asked 
about in standard surveys. A firm (e.g., a small-sized retailer, a large manufacturing firm 
a century ago) could be in the left-hand tail of the HRM frequency distribution with few 
measured practices (e.g., no HR department, written employment policies, or formal 
interview process) yet nonetheless have an informally implemented high performance- 
type labor management system. As one example, the Baldwin Locomotive Works 
(employment: 8,000) was widely cited around 1900 as having the most progressive and 
productive labor management system in American industry (with extensive job security, 
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training, etc.), yet it utilized practically no formal HRM practices to implement these 
(Brown, 1995).   
The third possibility is that the predictions of universalistic/RBV-based theories 
are correct but firms face huge adjustment costs and time lags in moving to an HPWS, in 
effect creating a very large-scale and long-lasting disequilibrium/market failure situation 
(Huselid, 1995). Pfeffer (1998: 29), for example, explains the large theory/practice gap 
with the “one-eighth rule” – despite the theory and evidence in support of HRM-firm 
performance principles, only one-half of employers believe in the people-profit 
connection; only one-half of this group will go beyond incremental, piecemeal change 
and put in place an entire HPWS system; and only one-half of these will maintain 
commitment to an HPWS over the long-run. Hence, although all firms would make more 
profit by being in the right-hand tail (in effect, collapsing the HRM frequency distribution 
around the HPWS model), due to problems of ignorance, lethargy, incremental 
implementation and lack of long-run commitment seven-eights of firms fail to adopt an 
HPWS and therefore (allegedly) forego substantial amounts of profit. Empirical research 
suggests that the amount of foregone profit is potentially quite large – according to 
Becker and Huselid (2006: 907), a one standard deviation change in the HR system is 
worth 10-20% of a firm’s market value.  
 Figure 1 takes an empirical approach to illustrating problems with the 
conventional definition of HRM/SHRM. Figure 2 takes a theoretical approach.   
Figure 2 depicts in panel (i) a competitive labor market in which demand (D) and supply 
(S) determine the equilibrium wage (W) and employment level of labor (L) and in panel 
(ii) a hierarchically organized firm (or other kind of producing organization). The firm is 
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the location of production, depicted by the production function situated within it. The 
production function contains the usual factor inputs capital (K) and labor (L), but also a 
third factor input HRM. The variable HRM represents all types of formal/tangible human  
Figure 2:  Two Modes of Coordinating HRM 
W 
S 
 
(i) Competitive Labor Market         (ii) Firm 
resource management practices (“tools”) used by firms, such as selection interviews and 
tests, training classes, employee involvement programs, benefits administration, and 
employee handbooks. These are considered inputs into production since more HRM 
practices presumably increase the effective utilization of labor and thus increase 
production (elaborated more later). These HRM practices are themselves produced by 
some process involving capital and labor, but this aspect is left implicit. The key 
consideration, however, is that because HRM practices have to be produced with real 
resources they carry an explicit cost to the firm.  
 Maximum profit requires that firms allocate and coordinate their labor input 
efficiently. As we know from institutional (transaction cost) economics, this can be 
accomplished through the use of two alternative coordinating mechanisms (and 
combinations thereof). The first is the market (“buy”), the second is management 
(“make”). The former takes place in the external labor market (ELM), the latter in the 
L1 L 
D
W1
Q=f(K,L,HRM)
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internal labor market (ILM). The ELM is coordinated by prices, competition and 
demand/supply; the ILM is coordinated by management hierarchy, command/authority 
and the use of policy and administrative methods (Williamson, 1985).  
 Firms following an “externalization” HRM strategy rely on the external labor 
market as much as possible to coordinate and allocate labor for production. Delery and 
Doty (1996, Table 1), for example, list representative HRM practices that go with what 
they call a “market-type” employment system. Their list includes items such as: “Hiring 
done almost exclusively from outside the organization,” “No formal training provided,” 
“Very little employment security given,” “Employees given little voice in the 
organization,” and “Jobs are not clearly defined.” It will be noticed that this list of HRM 
practices is the polar opposite of the list of HRM practices usually considered as the 
hallmark of an HPWS, and is also the polar opposite of those HRM practices a number of 
writers have identified as universally best practice.  
 Firms following an “internalization” practice, on the other hand, rely on 
management coordination and administration to a substantial degree and minimize the 
overt influence of the external labor market. Illustratively, Delery and Doty list the 
following kinds of HRM practices as representative of an “internal” employment system: 
“Hiring mainly from within the organization,” “Extensive formal training,” “Great deal 
of employment security,” “Employees more likely to participate in decision-making,” and 
“Jobs very tightly defined.”  These kinds of internal HRM practices correlate highly with 
the HRM practices in an HPWS and lists of universal best practices.    
 The potential for theoretical mis-specification of the HRM concept is now 
apparent. The human capital/ HPWS version of HRM is largely a mirror image of a 
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highly developed internal employment system. Theoretically, we know (further 
elaborated below) that employment systems can range along an entire spectrum, anchored 
at one end by a pure ELM and at the other end by a pure ILM. Yet the popular definition 
and conceptualization of HRM anchors the field toward one of these end points – the 
advanced ILM and a highly management-intensive employment model. This unbalanced 
treatment is recognized by Boselie, Dietz and Boon (2005: 73) who remark that HRM 
researchers take a “highly management-centric standpoint.” In effect, the popular 
conception of HRM locates the field in the right-hand tail of the HRM frequency 
distribution in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 where “make” dominates “buy” and the ILM in 
the right-hand part of the diagram greatly overshadows the ELM in the left-hand part.  
Why has modern HRM gravitated toward this ILM-dominated, management-
centric conception of its “independent variable?” On positive grounds, it is not 
unexpected that management scholars would center the HRM paradigm on the core 
subject of their discipline -- management, just as economists center their paradigm on 
markets and sociologists center their’s on social groups. In this respect, each discipline 
can be charged with having a restricted and mis-specified domain, perhaps excused on 
grounds of intellectual division of labor. Normative considerations, such as status-
enhancement, ideology and greater career rewards, also play an important but perhaps 
less defensible role (Wall and Wood, 2005; Geare, Edgar, and McAndrew, 2006). HRM 
is particularly influenced by these normative considerations, given the long-standing 
marginal status and tenuous institutional position of the HRM field in both academia and 
industry (Kaufman, 2001), and the large-size opportunities for enhanced research funds 
and consulting/career income if key decision-makers come to believe HRM is critical to 
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business and national competitiveness. A glimpse of these normative factors at work is 
revealed in Delery and Doty’s (1996: 802) remark that “SHRM has grown out of 
researchers’ desire to demonstrate the importance of human resource management 
practices for organizational performance;” Wright, Dunford and Snell’s (2001: 702) 
observation that, “Growing acceptance of internal resources as sources of competitive 
advantage brought legitimacy to HR’s assertion that people are strategically important to 
firm success;” and Ulrich’s (1998: 6) statement that “Theory enables HR to become a 
profession with a set of standards…Theory leads to respect….Physicians have a 
theory…, architects have theories… HR needs theory…” 
  
Theorizing Human Resource Management 
I wish to now move beyond critique to the task of theory-building. The theory I construct 
endeavors to bridge the ELM focus of standard labor economics and the ILM focus of 
standard human resource management. Providing this intellectual bridge has been the 
historical raison d’etre of the field of industrial/employment relations, and the theory to 
be constructed rests on insights from early IR academics and institutional labor 
economists, such as Commons, Bakke, Kerr and Dunlop. The theory itself is developed 
in two stages. In the first stage, I use insights from institutional (transaction cost) 
economics to theorize the correct specification of the concept of human resource 
management. Given this conceptualization of HRM, in the second stage I theorize the 
firm’s demand for formal HRM practices (including HR departments, HPWS practices, 
etc.), using the neoclassical microeconomic theory of factor input demand. This two-
stage theory generates a number of interesting insights and significant hypotheses.  
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 Although the use of the “human resource” term goes back more than a century 
(e.g., Commons, 1893), it was only in the 1960s that it became a label for a field of study 
and functional management vocation (Kaufman, 2001). The origin the modern HRM 
term is traceable to a published lecture given in 1958 by labor economist/IR scholar E. 
Wight Bakke. The title of the lecture is “The Human Resources Function.” I cite Bakke’s 
article here because it provides the broad conceptualization for HRM that the field 
currently slights. 
 Bakke makes several relevant points. First, he defines the human resources 
function broadly and generically as (p. 6): “the managerial function of dealing with 
people (p. 4)” and, in particular, the tasks “related to the understanding, maintenance, 
development, employment, and integration of one of the basic resources of the company 
– its people” (p. 23). Bakke asserts that the human resources function must be more 
broadly conceived than the activities of the HR department. He states (p. 21), for 
example, “The tasks in the human resources function carried on by the employees of the 
company are necessarily performed by all in the company who supervise the work of 
others, not just people labeled with personnel or labor relations titles.” Bakke also says 
regarding the objective of the human resources function (p. 17): “the general job of 
management is to use resources effectively for an organizational objective” and then 
specifically ties it to profitability, stating that “the function… be conducted so that the 
organization operates in the black, certainly in the long run.” He also highlights the 
strategic aspect of the human resources function, stating it must “contribute to major 
decision-making in all areas of company operations an understanding of the human 
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factors… [and] represent the human resources interest both in decision-making, 
operations, and evaluation of results.” 
To keep the terminology simple and consistent, I transition from Bakke’s label 
“human resources function” to the modern term “human resource management.” 
Nonetheless, it is useful to distinguish between two different conceptions of human 
resource management: Bakke’s broad, generic version and the current-day narrower 
HRM/SHRM version. The former will be denoted in italics as Human Resource 
Management (HRM), the latter in non-italicized form as Human Resource Management 
(HRM).   
Every multi-person firm, plant or other type of production unit must perform 
Human Resource Management; the same is true for any organization where production is 
carried out through the agency of an employment relationship. The HRM function is the 
generic process of coordinating the labor input in the production function inside the 
organization; it takes place, for example, in every organization where one person (the 
superior or “boss”) supervises and directs the labor of others (the subordinates or 
“workers”). In this guise, HRM happens in capitalist and socialist economies, in large and 
small firms, in profit and non-profit organizations, and in ancient and modern times.  
The activity of HRM makes use of certain generic human resource practices and 
activities. These include acquiring, developing, rewarding, evaluating, governing and 
terminating the workers who provide the labor input. Importantly, each of these can be 
performed with no formal HR department, staff or practice/program. For example, a firm 
can recruit and select new employees by having a manager carefully look over walk-ins 
and choose one or the other; the shift manager can take a few minutes and show a new 
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employee how to operate a piece of equipment; and the employer can conduct 
performance management by personally watching subordinates and terminate poor 
performers with a one sentence order “You’re fired!”. In terms of the production 
function, the general task of management control and coordination of the organization, 
including the activity of HRM, is simply another of the myriad “jobs” required to produce 
the good or service and, hence, is subsumed as part of the general labor input variable L.  
Sometimes, however, the coordination of the labor input is performed with the 
help of functional staff specialists trained in human resource management and organized 
into an HR department. Likewise, this coordination of the labor input is often facilitated 
by the use of formal labor management activities and practices, such as an employee 
handbook, a job application form, a half-day training session taught by a specialist, and a 
written annual performance evaluation. This narrower conception of the human resource 
function, including the SHRM/HPWS version, is denoted as HRM. The hallmark of this 
version of HRM is that it utilizes specialized staff and/or formal procedures and practices 
to help coordinate the labor input. This set of specialized staff and especially produced 
employment practices and activities is treated here as a separate factor input into 
production and, therefore, is represented by the variable HRM in the production function. 
It is often this conception of HRM practice that is utilized in regression studies of the 
HRM-firm performance relationship.   
Production in a multi-person organization cannot proceed without coordination 
and control of the labor input, so positive output Q requires positive expenditure on L in 
order that various organizational members take part of their time and effort to collectively 
perform HRM. The same is not true, however, for HRM. The firm may get positive Q 
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with a zero value of HRM, or it may decide to invest in a positive level of HRM in the 
production function if top management decides the extra revenue gained from 
expenditure on HRM outweighs the extra cost. 
This discussion brings us back to the external versus internal type of employment 
system and the issue of firm performance. It is theoretically quite possible and sometimes 
the case that organizations maximize performance by utilizing zero HRM. This would be 
the case, for example, where firms decide that “best practice” labor management (i.e., 
“most profits” labor management) is achieved with a completely external-oriented HRM 
system, implying no HR department and zero formal HRM practices. Were a researcher 
to come along and estimate the usual type of HRM-performance regression model 
(profitability as the dependent variable, HPWS-type employment practices as 
independent variables) for this sample of firms, the predicted sign on the HRM practice 
variables would be negative (not positive as usually assumed) since, by construction, 
expenditure on HRM in an external employment system adds more to cost than it 
generates in extra productivity and revenue.   
Let’s consider the theory more closely. The question of an external versus internal 
employment system is akin to the “make versus buy” decision in institutional (transaction 
cost) economics. Commons (1934) was the person who invented the concept of the 
transaction, which he defined as a “legal transfer of ownership” (p. 55). Commons also 
noted (before Coase) that resources can be coordinated and allocated by two different 
mechanisms: markets and the price system and organizations and management. He called 
the former “bargaining transactions” and the latter “rationing/managerial transactions” I 
will substitute the more transparent labels: “market transactions” (MT) and 
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“organizational transactions” (OT). Coase’s contribution, subsequently elaborated and 
developed by Williamson (1985), was to observe that the choice of using a market 
transaction (buy) or organizational transaction (make) turns in part on which mechanism 
accomplishes the resource coordination/property rights transfer function at least cost.  
Coase deduced that when market transaction costs are zero then all exchanges of 
property rights to productive resources will take place in markets and be coordinated by 
markets. Zero transaction cost arises, in turn, from assumptions of perfect information, 
perfect rationality, perfect partitionability/separability of property rights, and zero cost 
contract enforcement. A radical implication is that all firms (organizations), because they 
are a higher cost form of resource coordination, vertically disintegrate to the lowest 
possible level of economic organization – an economy of single person firms (e.g., family 
farms and independent contractors). Economists have traditionally called this model 
“perfect competition,” but Demsetz (1991) observes that the more accurate label would 
be “perfect decentralization.” Since all firms are sole proprietorships and have no 
employees, the HRM function even in generic form disappears (except perhaps in the 
trivial sense that the sole proprietor “self-coordinates” his/her labor in production). An 
economy of perfect decentralization is thus also an economy of “perfect externalization” 
in the sense that markets perform all the HRM activities of allocating and coordinating 
labor and management in organizations performs none. In terms of Figure 2, the pyramid 
representing the firm shrinks to the size of a single-person firm, leaving no room for 
HRM of any type.    
Coase did not consider the opposite case, but it is instructive to do so (Kaufman, 
2004). Here, using Commons’ dichotomy, MT cost is infinite (say because the 
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government makes market transfer of property rights illegal and punishable by death) but 
OT cost is minimal or even zero (due to perfect information, perfect government 
enforcement, etc.). This leads to the polar opposite form of economic organization, which 
may be called “perfect centralization.” It might also be labeled “perfect cooperation” or 
“perfect socialism,” in contradistinction to perfect competition and “perfect capitalism.” 
Here the economy vertically integrates into one giant all-encompassing “firm,” perhaps in 
the form of a centrally planned national economy. Since all resources are coordinated by 
management (e.g., an omniscient central planner, the analog to the Walrasian omniscient 
auctioneer in the general equilibrium economy of perfect decentralization) within this 
giant organization, the market completely disappears. In terms of Figure 2, the pyramid 
representing the firm expands until is encompasses all economic activity and the market 
diagram in panel (i) disappears. Since all productive resources are coordinated by 
management inside an organization, the economy of perfect centralization also represents 
“perfect internalization” with respect to the human resource function. If an internal 
employment system is exemplified by an HPWS, and if an HPWS is exemplified by 
organizational characteristics such as high job security, extensive vertical job ladders, 
careful selection into jobs, extensive training, team-forms of production, and some form 
of profit/gain-sharing, then an economy of perfect centralization is (in theory) one giant 
HPWS.  Accordingly, we would expect high organizational performance to be matched 
by a high level of HRM activities/practices – just the opposite case of perfect 
centralization and perfect externalization.  
The implication of this line of reasoning is that the institutional structure of 
production, and the attendant institutional structure of HRM, ranges along a theoretical 
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continuum from “perfect externalization” to “perfect internalization.” In the world of 
perfect externalization, firms maximize efficiency and profits but do so with no HRM 
(because there are only single-person firms). Hence, the HRM variable in the production 
function is zero. Somewhat more realistically, if market transaction cost is positive but 
modest-sized, small-scale multi-person firms may form but yet may continue to rely on a 
completely or mostly externalized employment system. Hence, the HRM variable in the 
production function may be zero or a small positive value.  
As the institutional structure of production progressively shifts toward 
internalization (including within it various types of employment systems, such as “craft,” 
“factory” and HPWS), firms size grows, as does labor immobility and firm-specific 
human capital. In such an environment, firms determine that “best practice” increasingly 
means investing more in formal management structures and practices, including HRM. 
When production reaches the stage of perfect internalization, the market no longer has 
any coordinating role and all labor coordination takes place through the use of HRM 
(e.g., a management-crafted employee handbook that, like a complete contract, specifies 
all methods, terms and conditions of employment and employment management). Of 
course, the real world is a mix of these two theoretical polar opposites, with the result that 
some firms cluster toward the “external” pole, others cluster toward the “internal” pole, 
and the bulk lie somewhere in the broad middle area with an employment system 
composed of some combination of external and internal HRM features/practices.  
 This insight is not new, although it tends to get submerged and neglected in the 
modern literature. Writing in 1956, IR scholars Douglass Brown and Charles Myers 
observed “Both now and at earlier periods, it would undoubtedly be possible to find 
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particular managements lying at every point on the spectrum of each aspect of industrial 
relations” (pp. 84-5, emphasis added). Mahoney and Deckop (1986), in their review of 
the HRM field circa the mid-1980s, argued that a useful way to begin theorizing HRM is 
to use the concepts of “structured” and “unstructured” labor markets advanced by 
institutional labor economist Clark Kerr as ideal types of polar opposite employment 
systems. But these concepts correspond almost exactly to the concepts of external and 
internal labor markets advanced here, and not surprisingly so since Kerr (along with 
Dunlop) was also an originator of the ILM idea. The notion that firms adopt different 
employment systems, with the ELM at one pole and ILM at the other, predates Kerr by 
another half-century, however. John Commons, in his book Industrial Goodwill (1919), 
distinguishes five distinct employment systems: “commodity” (demand/supply), 
“machine” (scientific management), “good will” (unitarist, high morale), “public utility” 
(employment security/protection), and “citizenship” (employee representation, voice and 
due process). The commodity model anchors the ELM end of the HRM continuum, the 
other four range somewhere in the middle, and a combined package of the four represents 
that era’s equivalent of an HPWS and anchors the ILM end of the spectrum.    
One also finds wide empirical evidence that “best practice” in labor management 
is associated with highly disparate HRM systems. Contemporary research reveals, for 
example, a very wide dispersion in HRM practices and employment systems in current-
day American firms, even among competing firms in the same industry where some 
adopt a highly externalized/low HRM-intensive system and others adopt a highly 
internalized/high HRM-intensive system (Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter, 1996). It is also 
revealed in the wide frequency distribution of HRM practices in Figure 1, and the fact 
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that nearly one-third of the firms in this sample did not even have a personnel/HR 
department. It is also revealed in firms’ HRM practices a century ago. In 1896 engineer 
Henry Roland published case studies of six model employers who he claimed had 
accomplished “financial success, along with full and happy lives of the workmen” 
(suggestive of a mutual-gain outcome). At one end of HRM practice was one company 
“without the faintest trace of a defined [labor] policy” (p. 76); at the other end was a 
company that “reaches success by the opposite course of precise law and rule [e.g., 
formal employment contracts, written supervisor reports], framed with infinite labor and 
minuteness of detail” (p. 395). Finally, ones see evidence of the firms moving from one 
employment system to another, such as the abandonment of ILMs by many Welfare 
Capitalist firms in the years of the Great Depression and then their reappearance in the 
1950s (Jacoby, 1997).  
 
Theorizing the Firm’s Demand for HRM Practices 
The central message of the previous section is that for all multi-person firms HRM must 
be a positive value but HRM may be zero. I now transition to the second-stage question: 
what determines the firm’s demand for specialized and formal HRM practices? Most 
HRM/SHRM researchers argue that the central question in the field is to determine what 
combination of HRM practices yields maximum firm performance, where HRM is 
typically defined in the narrower sense (as earlier illustrated). An economist would say: 
look no further than Figure 1! Although some firms no doubt mis-estimate their profit-
maximizing HRM bundle, or are constrained from adopting it in the short-run by various 
barriers and frictions, in the aggregate their position in the HRM frequency distribution 
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presumptively reflects – at least as a useful first approximation -- the outcome of an 
equilibrium choice process (contra the universalistic theory). The task is to model this 
choice process.  
The basic framework used here relies on the microeconomic theory of production 
and derived factor demand. The innovation is to consider formal HRM practices as 
similar in generic form to the services provided by other factor inputs, yielding a 
production function such as pictured in Figure 2 and re-stated in equation 1.  
1.   Q = f(K, L, HRM) 
The production function in equation 1 needs to be further modified, however, to 
better capture the effect of HRM on firm performance (the “black box” issue). This is 
done in equation 2: 
2.  Q = f[K,e(HRM)•L, HRM]  
The first revision of equation 1 is to expand the labor term from L to L·e. The L 
term is the number of persons/hours of labor; term e represents what Appelbaum, Bailey, 
Berg and Kalleberg (2000) refer to as “effective labor.” It represents both work 
motivation (effort) and skill-upgrading (training/learning), with a higher value of e 
connoting the worker produces more output due to harder/higher quality work or better 
skills. If e = 0 (e.g., workers sleep all day on the job or have zero skills for the job), then 
L·e = 0 and no output is forthcoming from the production function. The idea is that a firm 
hires a certain workforce of L but the amount of output produced is a function of the 
labor services (or “labor power”) provided by these workers, which is L·e.  
The second revision makes the amount of effective labor L·e a function of the 
level of HRM practices; that is, L·e(HRM). The idea is that HRM practices may 
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contribute to increased “effective labor” either by boosting motivation and effort or by 
increasing workers’ skills.  
Equation 2 shows that investment in additional HRM practices increases the 
amount of output Q in two ways (Kaufman, 2004). The first is the direct effect, 
representing the independent contribution that more units of input HRM has on 
production (the right-hand term in the production function), holding constant the amount 
of labor and capital services. The additional HRM practice might be in the area of 
employee selection, for example, and presumably greater investment in hiring tests, 
personal interviews, and psychological assessment will increase output Q independent of 
any change in the quantity of labor (through better matching of people to jobs, etc.). 
Alternatively, the extra expenditure on HRM practice might be a safety program that 
increases Q by reducing workplace accidents and production downtime, or the higher 
production (and lower cost) that results from reducing turnover through a job security 
provision or just-cause termination policy.  
The second channel by which additional inputs of HRM affect production is the 
indirect effect (the middle tern). The indirect effect captures the influence that more HRM 
practices have on output as they indirectly change the effective amount of effort e each 
worker provides. The indirect HRM effect can take a variety of forms. One example is 
greater effective labor due to the higher morale created by an employee involvement 
program; a second is greater effective labor through a formal training program.  
The choice problem for the firm is to select the level of HRM practices that 
maximizes profit (an analytic simplification that does not deny the second-order reality of 
other goals). The answer is given by solving equation 3.  
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3. Π  = P• f[K, e(HRM)•L, HRM] -V•HRM -W•L. 
Equation 3 states that profit (Π) is the difference between revenue and cost. Revenue is 
P·Q, with the production function in equation 2 substituted for Q. Assuming capital is 
fixed in the short-run, there are two elements of variable cost: labor cost and the cost of 
HRM practices. Assuming the cost of labor per unit is the wage W (including benefits 
costs, etc.), total labor cost is W·L. The HRM practices also have an explicit cost, 
denoted by V, since they are themselves produced with capital and labor. The total cost 
of HRM is, therefore, V·HRM. Although the wage W is, generically viewed, a 
component of the firm’s HRM, the choice problem considered here is the optimal level of 
management “manufactured” HRM, so W and V are separately distinguished (in effect, 
preserving the distinction between external and internal). For simplicity, the cost of HRM 
practices is assumed to be identical across firms, so V is a constant.  
The optimal level of HRM is determined by differentiating equation 3 with 
respect to HRM and solving for the first order condition. This is done in equation 4: 
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The left-hand side of the first-order condition (the bracketed term) is the marginal 
revenue product (MRP) of HRM practices. It is composed of two parts: the second term 
is the direct HRM effect (the extra product from more HRM services, holding labor 
services L constant) and the first term is the indirect HRM effect (the extra product that 
comes from the positive effect more HRM services has on employee work effort through 
morale, motivation, training, etc.). If labor were a commodity (i.e., inanimate factor 
input), the term e(HRM) becomes a constant and falls out of the first order condition, 
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leaving only the direct effect. If only the direct effect were present, human resource 
management would not be substantively different from operations management. 
The right-hand side of equation 4 is the unit price of HRM services V. In words, 
equation 4 is an example of the classic marginal decision-rule found throughout 
economics: the firm should keep investing additional money in HRM practices (an HR 
department, job evaluation, employee involvement, etc.) as long as the extra revenue 
created exceeds the extra cost incurred; when the two become equal the optimal level of 
HRM practices has been reached (Jones and Wright, 1992).  
The data in Figure 1 shows that some firms invest little or nothing in HRM 
practices, while others invest in an intermediate level and others in a high level. This 
theoretical model provides an explanation. Each firm, using equation 4, compares the 
extra productivity and revenue generated by using an additional unit of HRM practice in 
production with the extra cost incurred. Some firms, given their size, technology of 
production, skill and demographic characteristics of the workforce, and other such factors 
(spelled-out in more detail below), find that profits are maximized with zero HRM 
practices (e.g., an ELM-type employment system). Others find that profits are maximized 
with an intermediate level, and yet others find that with their size, technology of 
production, workforce skills/demographics, etc., a high level of HRM practices 
maximizes profit. Each firm’s place in the HRM distribution in Figure 1, therefore, is 
determined by the estimated benefit it gets from additional HRM versus the additional 
cost it incurs.  
In this model, if a firm is in the extreme left-hand tail the presumed reason is not 
because it is hugely foregoing profit due to inefficient management and/or large barriers 
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to adjustment (per the “one-eighth” rule) but precisely because the management has 
concluded that this position (few HRM practices) does maximize profit. A corollary is 
that the decision to treat HRM as a strategic variable is also endogenous and if the labor 
input is very inexpensive, and/or the impact of HRM on firm performance is very slight, 
then it is the hallmark of good management to recognize that strategic decision-making is 
itself a scarce/valuable resource and little of it should be allocated to HRM (or HRM 
departments/executives). In other words, it can be strategic for a firm to treat HRM 
and/or the HR department as non-strategic (tactical) elements.  
The HRM Demand Curve and HRM Demand Function. Equation 4 can be used to 
derive an HRM demand curve. An example of such a demand curve is depicted in Figure 
3 as D1. This demand curve is analogous to the demand curve for other factor inputs, such 
as labor, in that it represents the relationship between the firm’s demand for HRM 
practices and the price of HRM ($V), as well as numerous other variables. The HRM 
Figure 3. The Demand Curve for HRM Practices 
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upward sloping portion (not shown here for simplicity of exposition), but eventually will 
slope downward, given operation of the law of diminishing returns. The common sense 
of the downward slope is that beyond some point additional investment in HRM 
practices, such as additional hours of training or additional sophistication in selection 
tests, have a successively smaller positive effect on productivity and revenue.    
Assuming the price of HRM practices is a constant V1, the profit-maximizing 
level of HRM practices is HRM1 (point A). It is at this point that the equilibrium 
condition in equation 4 is satisfied; anywhere to the left the MRP of HRM exceeds the 
marginal cost and the firm adds to profit by expanding expenditure on HRM practices, 
anywhere to the right the opposite holds true.  
Figure 3 shows that a firm's use of HRM practices follows the law of demand, just 
as does its use of other factor inputs. Thus, a rise in the price of an HRM activity from V1 
to V2 causes a movement up the HRM demand curve D1 and a decline in quantity 
demanded from HRM1 to HRM2 (point A to point B). If an occupational licensing law 
were passed, for example, that requires all HRM practitioners to have a university 
master's degree, firms would have to pay a higher wage (salary) to attract these more 
educated workers. This higher labor cost would in turn increase the marginal cost of each 
unit of employee recruitment activity, or other such HRM input, leading to a movement 
up the HRM demand curve and a decline in the firm's quantity demanded. 
A firm’s demand for HRM practices is also influenced by all those variables that 
shift the HRM demand curve. These variables must affect one of the two determinants of 
the HRM input's marginal revenue product: the marginal physical product (the extra 
output produced) or the marginal revenue from this extra production (or both). Theory 
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suggests a number of these shift variables; others are more a matter of common sense 
observation or empirical determination (described shortly).  
Before proceeding further, it is useful to repackage equation 4 into a more 
tractable format. This is done in equation 5.  
5. HRM = f(Q, W, V, Xi) 
Equation 5, in effect, inverts the profit maximization equation in equation 4 and 
expresses the demand for the HRM input as a function of the level of output, the prices of 
factor inputs, and a host of other independent variables captured in the vector Xi. 
Equation 5 can be called the HRM demand function. Holding all other variables constant, 
changing the level of V in equation 5 causes a movement along the HRM demand curve 
D1 in Figure 3; holding V constant and changing one of the other variables in the demand 
function (e.g., larger scale of output) shifts the HRM demand curve to the right (D2) or 
left (D3). At a constant price of V1, a rightward shift of the firm’s demand for HRM 
practices leads to an increase in use of HRM practices from HRM1 to HRM2 (point A to 
point C); a leftward shift reduces HRM practices from HRM1 to HRM3 (point A to E).  
 The HRM demand curves in Figure 3 and the HRM demand function in equation 
5 can be used, respectively, to generate the HRM frequency distribution in Figure 1. 
Using the latter, at a point in time each firm has particular values of the variables V, W 
and the Xi, and, inserting these into the demand function, yields its optimal level of HRM 
practices. Plotting these equilibrium values traces-out the HRM frequency distribution, as 
in Figure 1. Alternatively, one can plot the position of all firm’s HRM demand curves in 
Figure 3 and, for a given price (e.g., V1), determine the same distribution of equilibrium 
values of the HRM practice variable. In effect, the distribution of HRM demand curves 
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maps-out an identical frequency distribution of HRM practices. Thus, the left-hand tail of 
the HRM frequency distribution is described by the one-third or so of firms that have a 
zero-to-small demand for HRM (e.g., demand curves to the left of D3), the center of the 
distribution is given by the majority of firms that have “intermediate” HRM demand 
curves (in a band around D1), and the skewed part of the right-hand tail is given by the 
relatively small number firms that have a very high demand for HRM (demand curves 
scattered far to the right of D2).  
 This model also explains changes in the HRM frequency distribution across time 
and countries. Illustratively, at the turn of the 20the century the HRM frequency 
distribution was highly compressed and centered very close to the vertical axis 
(Kaufman, 2007). As an example, in 1902 the world’s largest company, the United States 
Steel Corporation, employed 160,000 people but used practically zero formal HRM 
practices. The reason is that nearly all firms were using a highly externalized labor 
management system and thus had near-zero HRM demand curves. Over the ensuing 
decades, however, the HRM demand curves of many firms shifted successively to the 
right -- due to changes in production technology, unionization, legal regulation of 
employment, and other such factors, causing the mean and variance of the HRM 
frequency distribution to also increase. Variation in HRM demand curves also explains 
different HRM frequency distributions among countries, such as between the USA, 
France and India.    
If variation in demand curves explains the variation in firm-level HRM practices, 
then the next step in theorizing is to identify the specific shift factors in the HRM demand 
function that give rise to this variation.  Provided below are some of the shift factors that 
 36
theory and evidence suggest are most important. The first two (Q and W) are explicitly 
identified in equation 5; the remainder are subsumed in the vector Xi. This list is 
suggestive and not definitive. 
 Firm Size. The demand for HRM practices should increase with firm size, 
measured by level of output (Q) or level of employment (jointly determined by Q and W 
in eq. 5 and not therefore explicitly shown). This relationship is uniformly found in 
empirical studies (Boselie, Dietz, and Boon, 2005). A theoretical rationale is that the 
transaction cost of market governance increases with firm size due to greater difficulty 
and complexity of coordinating large groups of workers through market controls and 
incentives. 
 Wage Rate. The second variable in the HRM demand function in eq. 5 is the 
wage rate W. The wage may be either a substitute or complement for HRM practices 
(Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). In the former case, firms may use a higher W in 
lieu of formal HRM practices. An example would be efficiency wage theory where by 
paying a higher-than-market W employees are motivated to self-enforce higher work 
effort and firms can reduce direct HRM control devices, such as supervision and time 
clocks. In this case, a higher W would shift the HRM demand curve to the left. The 
opposite would occur where W and HRM practices are complements. In high 
performance work systems, for example, a high W and high level of HRM go together. 
One reason is that an HPWS requires a unitarist employment relationship and paying a 
high W creates higher employee commitment and loyalty and removes a source of 
potentially disruptive distributive bargaining (tacit or formal).  
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 Firm Age. The demand for HRM practices tends to increase with firm age. The 
longer-lived are firms, the more they develop rules and bureaucratic procedures to deal 
with employment policy and problems. Older firms (and plants), however, have more 
difficulty adopting new HRM practices, particularly as a complete package, implying a 
contingency between firm age and the type of HRM system (Appelbaum, et. al., 2000).  
Production Technology. Internalization of employment is encouraged by 
production technologies that are more complex, feature greater worker interdependencies 
(e.g., team forms of production), and allow greater room for discretionary effort. More 
complex technology makes employee selection more difficult and important and turnover 
more expensive; more extensive interdependencies in production increase the need to 
maintain and promote effective employee coordination and cooperation; and greater room 
for discretionary work effort heightens the importance of maintaining/promoting 
employee commitment and morale (Appelbaum, et. al., 2000). 
 Organizational Characteristics. An organizational characteristic likely to impact 
the demand for HRM practices is the degree of centralization of operations and 
management control. Companies that are more highly centralized, particularly if they 
have numerous geographically separated facilities and employee groups, are more likely 
to have a larger amount of formal HRM practices in order to maintain and promote 
consistency and company-wide coordination . Other potentially important organizational 
characteristics are profit/non-profit status and public/private ownership (Luthans and 
Sommer, 2005).    
 Training/Knowledge Characteristics. Internalization and demand for HRM will 
also be greater in firms where production involves greater specific on-the-job training. 
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Specific OJT creates a form of asset specificity, thus raising market transaction cost. 
Work systems that provide more opportunity for workers to develop and apply new 
knowledge for improvements in processes and products will also have a greater demand 
for HRM practices, per the implications of the resource based view of the firm. Lepak 
and Snell (1999) call these two characteristics “uniqueness” and “value.” 
 Workforce Characteristics. Firms will have a greater demand for HRM 
practices the greater the extent to which they obtain labor from, respectively, employees 
rather than contract/contingent workers, full-time rather than part-time workers, and 
workers with characteristics (e.g., education, skill) that are associated with higher 
turnover and (internal) training costs.  
 Economic/Market Conditions. Firms operating in more stable product markets 
and economic environments have a greater incentive to adopt ILMs and formal HRM 
practices (Orlitzky and Frenkel, 2005). ILMs involve greater employee investment 
expense, transform labor into a quasi-fixed cost, and introduce greater organizational 
rigidity. These conditions become progressively less economic in the face of greater 
volatility of sales and employment and shorter product life-cycles. ILMs and extensive 
HRM practices are also promoted when labor markets remain at or close to full 
employment. Not only does full employment increase the pressure to carefully select, 
develop and retain employees (due to scarcity of qualified labor in the external market), it 
also reduces the ability of firms to use the threat of unemployment as an effective and 
less costly motivation/discipline device. 
 HRM Innovations. The number and sophistication of HRM tools available to 
firms expands over time due to new discoveries and innovations in HRM organization, 
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methods, and practices. New innovations increase productivity and/or lower cost, thus 
increasing HRM demand.  
 Unionization. The presence of a union in the firm, or closely competing firms, is 
likely to increase the demand for HRM practices. A union endeavors to negotiate more 
formalized, structured and standardized employment management practices. A firm with 
a union must, therefore, invest more in HRM. If closely competing firms have a union, or 
a strong organizing threat otherwise exists, an unorganized firm will also attempt to 
preserve its non-union status through greater HRM. Possibly, however, unionization may 
lead to lower HRM if the union takes over certain functions (e.g., selection and hiring 
through a hiring hall) or resists certain practices (e.g., profit-sharing).  
 Government. Greater government regulation of employment heightens the 
incentive of firms to adopt formal HRM practices in order to comply with government 
mandates, avoid legal costs, and maintain a positive community image. Firms also 
practice more extensive HRM in order to forestall the threat of greater government 
regulation of employment (“government avoidance,” akin to union avoidance).  
 Social/Cultural Factors. Companies create distinct social environments and 
organizational cultures, some of which promote a demand for HRM practices and others 
which don’t. Companies, for example, that seek to inculcate esprit d’corps, loyalty and 
egalitarianism will have a greater demand for HRM practices; companies where work is 
“only a job” or a short-term instrumental relationship will have a smaller demand for 
HRM. Social and cultural factors can also explain HRM practice variation across nations 
and, perhaps, regions or ethnic groups. HRM was slower to develop and spread in the UK 
than the USA, for example, in part because of the British social ethos that in earlier years 
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downgraded professional management and the importance of management education. 
HRM, on the other hand, has been strongly emphasized in Japanese firms, partly because 
of a social ethos that puts a high emphasis on preserving group harmony and long-term 
employment relationships.   
 Management Philosophy. Company owners and top executives differ in their 
philosophies and attitudes toward employees and labor management practices. This factor 
most closely corresponds to the “taste” variable in the traditional microeconomic theory 
of demand. Quite apart from profit considerations, some owners/executives take an 
“employee-oriented” approach as a matter of managerial philosophy and hence tend to 
put more resources into HRM, while others have a “hired hands” viewpoint and 
accordingly give HRM little emphasis. 
 Business Strategy. I put last in the list of shift factors what most HRM 
researchers would probably put first: the firm’s business strategy. Theoretically, however, 
a legitimate question arises whether a business strategy variable has independent 
explanatory power in the HRM demand function. That is, business strategy can be 
thought of at the most basic level as determining the best means to reach given ends 
(Boxall and Purcell: 34). Applied to HRM, this naturally leads to Wright and McMahan’s 
(1992: 298) oft-quoted definition of SHRM: “the pattern of planned human resource 
deployments and activities intended to enable an organization to achieve its goals.” But in 
a world of perfect information and competitive markets, “business strategy” is nothing 
but a restatement of the firm’s profit-maximization problem in equation 3 which, when 
solved, yields the various first order conditions determining product prices, level of 
output, and the usage and mix of factor inputs. If all the relevant variables that affect 
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profits are included in equation 3 and the problem is correctly optimized by business 
decision-makers, the firm’s “business strategy” (means-ends choice) emerges as the 
solution of the model – that is, the solution is the strategy. Since the HRM demand 
function in equation 5 is derived from the solution of the model, the predicted value of 
HRM practices that comes from it already completely reflects and incorporates (via the 
Q, W, V and Xi variables) the firm’s choice of business strategy. Vertical fit is thus an 
outcome of solving the model, while a separate variable in the HRM demand function 
called “business strategy” becomes redundant and empty of conceptual content.  
 This conclusion holds, of course, only in the context of the highly artificial and 
restrictive assumptions of the simple neoclassical model. When the model is modified to 
incorporate more realistic features, such as bounded rationality, intra-organizational 
politics, and a variety of market imperfections (e.g., barriers to entry, heterogeneous 
resources), the concept of business strategy gains independent explanatory power for the 
firm’s means-ends choice is no longer deterministic or obvious. Firms with the same 
variables in the HRM demand function, therefore, may adopt different business strategies 
in their quest to maximize profit, yielding in turn different outcomes for the HRM 
practice variable in equation 5. One must nevertheless be cautious in the use and 
interpretation of standard business strategy typologies in the HRM demand function (e.g., 
“prospector versus defender”), as choice of a particular strategy is presumably itself a 
function of the other independent variables. To the degree some of these variables are 
omitted from the HRM demand function, the strategy variable proxies for their influence. 
These considerations perhaps explain the weak and inconsistent empirical findings 
regarding the link between business strategy and HRM practices (Boxall, 2007) 
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Insight on the HRM-Firm Profitability Relationship. The maintained hypothesis in 
most of the HRM literature is that some variant of the best practice/HPWS employment 
system leads to higher firm performance. The model presented here is useful for 
analyzing the validity of this claim.   
If profitability is the dependent variable, these studies are essentially estimating 
outcomes generated by equation 4. If product and labor markets are perfectly competitive 
and observed HRM outcomes are equilibrium values, the model implies that the 
estimated regression coefficient on HRM should be zero (not positive).That is, standard 
microeconomic theory shows that competition equalizes the return to every factor input 
across firms, implying that all firms increase (or decrease) their usage of HRM until a 
uniform rate of return is achieved. If adoption of more HRM did lead to greater 
profitability for some firms, they would have an incentive to do exactly this and would 
continue to invest in more HRM until the profit differential is eroded to zero (realized by 
several HRM writers, such as Becker and Huselid, 2006: 905).  
This process is easily represented in Figure 3. Assume two firms are identical but 
the “one-eighth” rule is operative and Firm 2 correctly estimates the “true” productivity 
of HRM while Firm 1 seriously under-estimates it. Accordingly, Firm 1 has the “low” 
HRM demand curve D1 in Figure 3 and Firm 2 has the “high demand curve D2. If both 
face the same HRM cost of V1, Firm 1 adopts a low level of HRM of HRM1, Firm 2 
adopts a high level of HRM2. Profit is the difference between revenue and cost, which 
can be approximated in Figure 3. The revenue contribution of HRM for Firm 1 is the area 
under the demand curve up to HRM1, given by the rectangle 0FAHRM1; the cost of this 
level of HRM is the area 0V1AHRM1. The profit contribution of HRM for Firm 1 is, 
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therefore, the difference; that is, the triangle area V1FA. By similar reasoning, the profit 
contribution of HRM for Firm 2 is the larger triangle area V1GC. Clearly, Firm 2 is more 
profitable than Firm 1 and the reason is that it utilizes more HRM.  
If markets are competitive, however, this outcome cannot be a long-run 
equilibrium solution. Firm 1 is sub-optimizing and therefore earns less than a normal 
profit. It will either go out of business or learn from the pressure of competition that to 
survive it needs to increase its use of HRM to HRM2. Either way, in the long run the only 
demand curve left in the diagram is D2 and, accordingly, otherwise identical firms then 
have the same profitability.    
A number of empirical studies (reviewed in Coombs, et. al., 2006) report, 
however, a positive coefficient on the HRM variable(s). This result may be real, transient, 
spurious, or misleading. It may be real if, as hypothesized by the RBV theory of the firm, 
greater usage of HRM creates superior profits and for some reason other firms cannot 
easily replicate this. The extra-normal return to HRM is thus a form of economic rent, 
such as accrues to any extra productive resource that is restricted in supply (e.g., high 
fertility land). Such a rent is entirely plausible, but to be convincing theorists must also 
explain why other firms cannot easily replicate the HRM practice(s), given that most 
HRM practices are fairly simple, widely known and of moderate cost. Several tacks have 
been taken in the literature. One is to argue that the real boost to profit comes from the 
entire package of HPWS practices and successfully implementing the entire system is 
difficult. A second is to argue that the profit effect does not come directly from the HRM 
practices but from the more skilled, motivated and productive human capital they 
facilitate (e.g., through the “indirect effect” in eq. 4). Here again, however, it must be 
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explained why all firms cannot use HRM to capture this extra profit. A possible answer is 
that only a minority of employers/managers have the skills and/or motivation to 
successfully implement an HPWS-type system (Becker and Huselid, 2006; Purcell and 
Hutchinson, 2007). Evidence supports this contention, but the true source of the rent is 
not HRM but scarce and difficult-to-reproduce managerial talent.  
The positive HRM coefficient in regression equations may also be a transient 
effect. For example, the performance/HRM data gained from cross-sectional surveys and 
other such sources may not be equilibrium outcomes, implying the demand curves for 
low-HRM firms (such as D3) have not had sufficient time to catch-up with those of high-
HRM firms (such as D2). One plausible explanation is that once firms adopt an HRM 
system they tend to get locked into it, giving rise to a “vintage” effect where older firms 
(or plants) are more likely to use a traditional personnel management/industrial relations 
employment system while newer firms/plants are more likely to use a new 
“transformational” HPWS system. Another is that firms engage in imitation and “herd 
behavior,” introducing time lags and faddish waves in HRM (Paauwe and Boselie, 2005).    
A positive HRM coefficient may also be a spurious statistical result due to factors 
such as omitted variables bias and reverse causality (Gerhart, 2007). As an example of 
the former, product markets may be imperfectly competitive, say due to economies of 
scale or other barriers to entry, and hence the larger-sized firms that on average utilize 
more HRM practices also on average have higher profitability. What appears as a rent 
generated by HRM is in fact a rent attributable to an unmeasured product market 
imperfection. Similarly, firms using an HPWS may appear to have greater profitability 
(e.g., return on assets) but this may be a mirage since the dependent variable is artificially 
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inflated because the denominator only includes the value of physical capital and not their 
large investment in human/social capital. As a number of studies have also noted, the 
positive HRM coefficient may also be a statistical artifact arising from reverse causality – 
that is, the causal arrow goes from profits to more HRM, rather than the reverse. In 
Figure 2, reverse causality means that firms with higher profits also have higher HRM 
demand curves, say due to rent-sharing with employees.   
A positive HRM coefficient may also provide a misleading indication of the true 
effect of more HRM on firm performance. A number of studies (see Coombs, et. al., 
2006), for example, measure firm performance with intermediate outcome variables, such 
as the employee turnover rate and labor productivity, and find that more HRM lowers the 
former and raises the latter. It is entirely possible, however, to find positive HRM 
performance effects on these variables and yet for HRM to have a zero or even negative 
effect on the more fundamental outcome variable – firm profitability. Greater expenditure 
on HRM, for example, may lower turnover and increase productivity yet profit will go 
down if the cost of HRM is greater than the extra revenue generated by the lower 
turnover or higher productivity (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). 
The Equilibrium Mix of Several HRM Inputs. The model has been used to address 
three fundamental features of the HRM frequency distribution depicted in Figure 1 – the 
firm’s place in the frequency distribution, the shape of the distribution, and changes in the 
distribution over time and across countries. A fourth important feature remains: the mix 
or “bundle” of individual HRM practices that comprise each firm’s overall position in the 
distribution. Thus, Freeman and Rogers (1999) found that firms in the right-hand tail of 
the distribution not only used more HRM practices but also tended to adopt a particular 
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mix of practices, such as employee involvement, formal dispute resolution, and gain-
sharing forms of pay. Firms in the left-hand tail, on the other hand, not only invested in a 
low level of HRM practices but also chose a mix of HRM practices often associated with 
a “low involvement” or “low road” employment system.  
The challenge is to model the process by which firms mix and match individual 
HRM practices to form an overall HRM system. To begin, one could replace the 
composite HRM practice variable (HRM) in equations 3 and 4 with a vector of n 
individual HRM functional practice areas, denoted HRMi (i = 1, …., n). Thus, HRM1 = 
selection, HRM2 = training, HRM3 = employee benefits, and so on, with higher values of 
HRMi representing more extensive/intensive deployments. The per-unit cost of input 
HRM1 is V1, the per-unit cost of input HRM2 is V2, and so on. In a yet more realistic but 
also complex treatment, one could further decompose the i HRM functional practice 
areas into j (j = 1,….., m) alternative methods. Thus, assume HRM1 stands for selection 
and HRM2 is training; then HRM11 and HRM12 stand for two specific selection methods 
(e.g., background checks and ability tests) and HRM 21 and HRM22 stand for two 
methods of training (e.g., on-the-job and classroom training). The individual HRMi and 
HRMij may be complements or substitutes in production, as discussed below.  
The first-order condition in equation 4 expands to n first-order conditions, such as 
indicated in equations 6: 
6.       V1  =  MRP1 
          V2  =  MRP2 
                 . 
          Vn =  MRPn. 
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Equations 6 states in words that additional units of each individual HRM practice should 
be committed to production as long as the marginal increase in revenue exceeds the 
marginal increase in cost.  
In much the same way as consumers maximize total utility by equating the 
marginal utility per dollar spent on each item consumed, firms maximize profit by 
equating the marginal revenue product per dollar-cost of each input used in the 
production process. Thus, the equilibrium amount of multiple HRM inputs is given by 
equation 7: 
7.  MRP1/V2 = MRP2/V2   …= MRPn/Vn     
This equation states that the firm should adjust the amount of each HRM input until the 
revenue gain per dollar of expenditure on each is equal. If, ceteris paribus, the MRP of 
the employee selection function increases (say due to a tighter labor market and greater 
scarcity of qualified employees), the firm maximizes profit by reallocating HRM 
expenditures from training to selection. 
 An interesting question in HRM research is the extent to which firms mix and 
match individual HRM practices into a smaller set of identifiable packages or bundles 
(the configurational perspective).  Sometimes these bundles are called employment 
systems. One such bundle, for example, is an HPWS. Several writers have identified up 
to a half-dozen alternative employment systems, each distinguished by a distinctive set of 
HRM practices (e.g., Osterman, 1987; Begin, 1991; Marsden, 1999; Baron, Burton, and 
Hannan, 1999). Begin, for example, identifies these six systems: simple, machine, 
professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, missionary and divisional. 
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 The individual HRM practices will cluster together into a smaller set of 
identifiable systems if the individual HRMi (and HRMij) are related to each other in 
production as complements or substitutes (MacDuffie, 1995; Laursen and Foss, 2003). To 
measure this relation we must return to the profit function, initially presented in equation 
3 but modified below in equation 8. Equation 8 simplifies the profit function by 
specifying the labor input as the single variable L, but complicates it by separating the 
HRM variable into the separate individual HRM practices, HRMi.   
8.  Π  = P• f[K, L, HRMi] -Vi•HRMi -W•L. 
The HRM inputs may be independent (separable, additive) in production, or may 
be related as complements or substitutes. Two HRM practices, such as HRM1 and HRM2, 
are complements in production if δΠ2/ δHRM1 δHRM2 > 0 or, in words, if an increase in 
the usage of one HRM input raises the marginal profit return to the other (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1991: 108). This might be the case, for example, if greater expenditure on 
employee selection increases the return on a given expenditure on employee training 
(perhaps because of a better person/job fit and thus greater productivity in training). 
Alternatively, HRM inputs may be substitutes in that greater usage of one reduces the 
marginal profit return to the other (the second derivative of the profit function is 
negative). An example would be if greater expenditure on employee involvement reduces 
the return on quality inspection staff. A third possibility is that the HRM inputs are 
completely separable, making the second derivative zero.  
 The profit function provides a convenient way to empirically test the relationship 
between individual HRM practices. This is illustrated in equation 9. Equation 9 specifies 
a representative HRM-firm performance regression equation. The dependent variable is 
 49
firm profitability, Z is a vector of control variables, and the HRMi are individual HRM 
practices, and ε is a random error term. In practice, studies often combine the HRMi into 
a composite measure of HRM practices, but to test for interdependence they must be 
disaggregated into two or more groups (e.g., MacDuffie, 1995; Black and Lynch, 2001). 
To keep the notation simple, I assume in equation 9 that there are only two groups of 
HRM practices, HRM1 and HRM2.  These are entered in the regression separately and 
then an interaction term HRM1·HRM2 is also introduced (Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi, 1997).  
 9.      Π = β0 + β1HRM1 + β2 HRM2  + B3HRM1 · HRM2  + β4 Z  + ε   
The coefficient on the interaction term provides the evidence on whether HRM1 and 
HRM2 are separable, complements or substitutes. That is, the inputs are complements if 
β3 > 0 (and is statistically significant), are substitutes if β3 < 0, and are separable if β3 = 
0. For example, the marginal effect of additional use of HRM1 on profits is given by β1 + 
β3 HRM2. If β3 > 0, then the return to HRM1 rises as more of HRM2 is used, per the 
definition of complementary inputs given above. An interesting extension of equation 9 
would be to include the wage rate W as a separate independent variable and interact it 
with the HRMi variables in order to determine whether W and HRMi are complements or 
substitutes (earlier discussed).  
In theory, relations of complementarity and substitutability can be estimated for 
any number of separate HRM practice variables, as well with other independent variables 
such as the wage, by including the requisite interaction terms in the profit equation. In 
actual empirical estimation, this technique is heavily constrained by problems of co-
linearity and degrees of freedom (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). An alternative approach 
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is to go back to the HRM demand function in equation 5 and disaggregate it into a series 
of regression equations estimated over individual HRMi. An empirical technique, such as 
cluster analysis, could then be used to see if the predicted values of the HRMi sort into 
identifiable groups, perhaps conditional on certain contingent independent variables.  
  
Conclusion 
If HRM is going to be a positive value-neutral science, it must first seek to explain the 
world as it is, not as scholars think it should be. Much current and past HRM research 
starts from, or is unduly influenced by, the latter approach, leading to a biased 
conceptualization of the HRM construct and theories that have limited domain and 
explanatory power.  
 This paper makes two fundamental contributions to advancing a positive theory of 
HRM. The first is to identify the major type of empirical phenomenon that a theory of 
HRM must seek to explain and predict. This phenomenon is the frequency distribution of 
HRM practices (Figure 1), both among firms (and nations) at a point in time and changes 
in this distribution over time. Granted, not all HRM theories will have equal applicability 
to this issue, and certainly other empirical phenomena in HRM also deserve attention, but 
nonetheless the ability to explain all parts of the HRM frequency distribution, and its 
major features, surely must stand as a central litmus test for any and all theories in this 
field. Based on this standard, I judge that most existing HRM theories are partial, 
incomplete and biased toward larger firms located in the right-hand tail.  
  The second major contribution of the paper is to develop a new theoretical 
framework for HRM. This framework, drawing principally from economics and 
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industrial relations, provides a theoretical explanation for the HRM frequency 
distribution. The central analytical construct is an HRM input demand function and 
demand curve. Although this model is more abstract and mathematical than is common 
for the HRM field (perhaps regarded negatively by some as vacuous formalism), my 
claim is that this abstractness and formalism have a large pay-off because they yield a 
theory with much greater generality and explanatory power. For example, not only can 
the theory explain the major features of the HRM frequency distribution, it also provides 
a convenient and insightful framework for structuring empirical work (the HRM input 
demand function can readily be operationalized as a single equation regression model) 
and provides deeper insight into the conditions under which HRM will (and will not) 
have a positive effect on firm performance. Finally, this model also illuminates two 
fundamentally different strategies for theorizing HRM. The approach adopted here treats 
the firm’s place in the HRM frequency distribution as an equilibrium outcome (or 
tendency) of deliberative management choice explicable in terms of a rational (or mostly 
rational) weighing of benefits and costs; the approach explicit or implicit in many extant 
theories assumes most (perhaps all) firms should be located toward the right-hand tail 
(i.e., utilizing some variant of an HPWS) and thus requires some type of disequilibrium 
model to explain why they are located far from this desired position (e.g., in the left-hand 
tail) and the factors that determine (or inhibit) the rate of movement toward their desired 
place in the frequency distribution. Although both modeling strategies have their 
advantages and disadvantages, I suspect the equilibrium approach used here is not only 
more analytically tractable but also more productive of insight and testable hypotheses.    
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